Epistemic status - Revision history

GSalmieri: /* Epistemic Status as Relative to an Audience and Objective */

2025-08-22T17:35:50Z

Epistemic Status as Relative to an Audience and Objective

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:35, 22 August 2025
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	Since the premises are false this argument doesn’t give us any reason to believe that pigs are mammals, but it certainly doesn’t show that they’re ''not'' mammals!		Since the premises are false this argument doesn’t give us any reason to believe that pigs are mammals, but it certainly doesn’t show that they’re ''not'' mammals!

	=Epistemic Status as Relative to ~~an Audience and Objective~~=		=Epistemic Status as Objective Relative to a Subject=

	To be known is to be known to ''someone'', and different people know different things. In an argument~~, premises are being offered~~ to ~~''someone'' as~~ a ~~reason~~ to ~~accept some~~ conclusion~~. Let’s call the person or people to whom an argument~~ is ~~being given the audience. Clearly~~, ~~then, in assessing~~ the premises ~~of an argument, what we need to figure out~~ is whether ''~~the audience knows them~~''—or, more generally, what their epistemic status is for the audience. When we speak of epistemic status, we always mean the epistemic status of a particular proposition for a particular audience. And the same proposition may have a different epistemic status for different audiences.<ref>To illustrate this, imagine a large party at which Al, Barbara, Carla, and Dan are all in attendance. Al and Barbara hardly ever socialize without one another, and both Carla and Dan know ~~this~~. ~~While Barbara is waiting in line~~ to ~~get refreshments, Al heads~~ to the ~~bathroom~~, ~~running into Carla on the way. When Carla sees Al, she infers~~ that ~~Barbara is also at the party, though she can’t be quite~~ certain of ~~this, because it could be one of those rare occasions when one of the two socializes without~~ the other~~. In the meantime, Dan sees Barbara waiting in line and infers~~ that ~~Al is at the party~~. ~~Like Carla, he~~ is ~~not quite certain of his~~ conclusion~~. So~~, ~~Carla and Dan both believe that Al~~ and ~~Barbara are both at~~ the ~~party. Carla knows~~ that ~~Al is at~~ the ~~party and the proposition that Barbara is there has a weaker~~ epistemic status~~, whereas~~ the ~~situation is reversed~~ for ~~Dan~~.~~</ref>~~		To be known is to be known to ''someone'', and different people know different things. If you're assessing an argument to figure out whether it puts you in a position to tell that its conclusion is true, what matters about the premises is whether ''you'' know them. But if you're giving an argument to someone else to help them tell that the conclusion is true, it won't do you any good to use premises that you're certain of if the other person has no way to tell that they're true. An argument is a reason for ''someone'' to believe its conclusion, and how strong the argument is for that someone will depend on the epistemic status the premises have for that someone. Let's call the someone "the subject."

	We must take care, however, not to confuse a proposition’s epistemic status for an ~~audience~~ with how firmly the ~~audience~~ believes it. By the firmness of a belief, I mean how steadfast the ~~audience~~ is in holding it. We can think of this as how easy it would be to talk someone out of the belief. The stronger a proposition’s epistemic status is, the more steadfast it is reasonable to be in believing it. It would be unreasonable of someone to get talked out of something he knows to be true. (Indeed, if he was talked out of it, we would probably conclude that he didn’t really ''know'' it in the first place.) However, people can sometimes be quite firm in beliefs that have a very low epistemic status. One example would be a fervent racist who, despite all the evidence to the contrary, persists in the belief that the members of other races are inferior to members of his own. Another example would be a self-deceived husband who clings to the belief that his wife is faithful to him, despite strong evidence that she is having an affair.		The epistemic status of a proposition is relative to a subject, in the sense that the same proposition will have different statuses for different subjects. Consider the proposition "Lightning just struck the bell tower." This would be ''certain'' for a subject who saw the lightning strike the tower, and ''unfounded'' for another subject who has no idea that a lightning storm is even taking place. And it might be ''possible'' for a third subject who saw lightning strike in the area, but doesn't know what building it hit.

			But even though the proposition has different epistemic statuses relative to these different subjects, its status is not ''subjective'' in the sense of being determined by the subject's feelings or opinions.

			We must take care, however, not to confuse a proposition’s epistemic status for an a subject with how firmly the subject believes it. By the firmness of a belief, I mean how steadfast the person is in holding it. We can think of this as how easy it would be to talk someone out of the belief. The stronger a proposition’s epistemic status is, the more steadfast it is reasonable to be in believing it. It would be unreasonable of someone to get talked out of something he knows to be true. (Indeed, if he was talked out of it, we would probably conclude that he didn’t really ''know'' it in the first place.) However, people can sometimes be quite firm in beliefs that have a very low epistemic status. One example would be a fervent racist who, despite all the evidence to the contrary, persists in the belief that the members of other races are inferior to members of his own. Another example would be a self-deceived husband who clings to the belief that his wife is faithful to him, despite strong evidence that she is having an affair.

	One way to formulate the distinction between firmness of belief and epistemic status is to say that the former is ''subjective'' and the latter ''objective''. Something is subjective if it is determined by someone’s feelings or opinions. It is objective if it is determined by the facts. Though different people know different things, whether a particular person knows something or not is not determined simply by whether he ''thinks'' or ''feels like'' he knows it, since many people think they know things that they don’t. Nor is something’s epistemic status for someone a matter of his feelings or opinions about it. The epistemic status of a proposition for a given person is determined by facts about such things as the observations he has made and the arguments he has.		One way to formulate the distinction between firmness of belief and epistemic status is to say that the former is ''subjective'' and the latter ''objective''. Something is subjective if it is determined by someone’s feelings or opinions. It is objective if it is determined by the facts. Though different people know different things, whether a particular person knows something or not is not determined simply by whether he ''thinks'' or ''feels like'' he knows it, since many people think they know things that they don’t. Nor is something’s epistemic status for someone a matter of his feelings or opinions about it. The epistemic status of a proposition for a given person is determined by facts about such things as the observations he has made and the arguments he has.

Stevenwarden at 00:13, 29 August 2024

2024-08-29T00:13:11Z

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	=Possibility=		=Possibility=
	A proposition that is not probable may still qualify as '''possible'''. To call a proposition “possible” in the relevant sense is to say that there is ''some reason'' to believe it and that it is, therefore, reasonable to regard it as something that “might be” true and to consider it in our thinking. Thus, in the example ~~from~~ above concerning Bob, it is at least possible that he was on the quad at 8:00am (even if it turns out that it is not probable). He ''might'' have been there.		A proposition that is not probable may still qualify as '''possible'''. To call a proposition “possible” in the relevant sense is to say that there is ''some reason'' to believe it and that it is, therefore, reasonable to regard it as something that “might be” true and to consider it in our thinking. Thus, in the example above concerning Bob, it is at least possible that he was on the quad at 8:00am (even if it turns out that it is not probable). He ''might'' have been there.

	Perhaps you’re thinking that “anything is possible” and that you would be in a position to say that Bob “might have been on the quad” even if you hadn’t had the experience of seeing someone who you thought you recognized as him there. There is a sense of the word “possible” in which you could say that it was possible that Bob was on the quad, even if you hadn’t had the experience, but there is another sense of the word in which this would be false. And it is this sense—let’s call it ''epistemic possibility'' that is relevant for our present purposes.		Perhaps you’re thinking that “anything is possible” and that you would be in a position to say that Bob “might have been on the quad” even if you hadn’t had the experience of seeing someone who you thought you recognized as him there. There is a sense of the word “possible” in which you could say that it was possible that Bob was on the quad, even if you hadn’t had the experience, but there is another sense of the word in which this would be false. And it is this sense—let’s call it ''epistemic possibility'' that is relevant for our present purposes.

Stevenwarden at 23:59, 28 August 2024

2024-08-28T23:59:57Z

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	=Certainty=		=Certainty=

	Let’s start with '''certainty'''. We’ve been using this word a lot in the last few paragraphs, in a way that makes it seem to be nearly synonymous with “knowledge”. Understanding the relation between these two concepts will help us to understand epistemic status better. To be ''certain'' of a proposition is to ''regard it as knowledge'', as opposed to regarding it as doubtful. When you are certain of something you act on it and draw inferences from it confidently, whereas when you are uncertain you are more tentative, always keeping in mind the possibility that the proposition is false and planning for that contingency. In this sense, people are sometimes certain of things unreasonably. A fervent racist, for example, might ~~be certain that other races are inferior to his own and~~ not hesitate to act on his belief. However, when we speak of certainty as an epistemic status, we are referring not to the way a person actually does regard the proposition but to the way it is ''reasonable'' for him to regard it. We might call this ''rational certainty'' or ''objective certainty'' (as opposed to subjective certainty). In any case, this is how I am going to use the word “certain” going forward.		Let’s start with '''certainty'''. We’ve been using this word a lot in the last few paragraphs, in a way that makes it seem to be nearly synonymous with “knowledge”. Understanding the relation between these two concepts will help us to understand epistemic status better. To be ''certain'' of a proposition is to ''regard it as knowledge'', as opposed to regarding it as doubtful. When you are certain of something you act on it and draw inferences from it confidently, whereas when you are uncertain you are more tentative, always keeping in mind the possibility that the proposition is false and planning for that contingency. In this sense, people are sometimes certain of things unreasonably. A fervent racist, for example, might not hesitate to act on his belief. However, when we speak of certainty as an epistemic status, we are referring not to the way a person actually does regard the proposition but to the way it is ''reasonable'' for him to regard it. We might call this ''rational certainty'' or ''objective certainty'' (as opposed to subjective certainty). In any case, this is how I am going to use the word “certain” going forward.

	There are some disputes among epistemologists about the relationship between certainty and knowledge. However, the following is comparatively uncontroversial: ''the beliefs that a person is entitled to classify as knowledge and those that he is entitled to classify as certain are the same''. The difference between classifying them as certain and classifying them as knowledge is that, in classifying them as certain, he is contrasting them specifically with beliefs that have a lower epistemic status and is focusing on the fact that he is in a position to act on these beliefs and to draw inferences on these beliefs without hesitation.<Ref>Among the disputed issues are whether it is possible to be certain of something that one doesn’t actually know and whether it is possible to know something without being certain of it.</Ref>		There are some disputes among epistemologists about the relationship between certainty and knowledge. However, the following is comparatively uncontroversial: ''the beliefs that a person is entitled to classify as knowledge and those that he is entitled to classify as certain are the same''. The difference between classifying them as certain and classifying them as knowledge is that, in classifying them as certain, he is contrasting them specifically with beliefs that have a lower epistemic status and is focusing on the fact that he is in a position to act on these beliefs and to draw inferences on these beliefs without hesitation.<Ref>Among the disputed issues are whether it is possible to be certain of something that one doesn’t actually know and whether it is possible to know something without being certain of it.</Ref>

Stevenwarden at 23:59, 28 August 2024

2024-08-28T23:59:06Z

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	=Certainty=		=Certainty=

	Let’s start with '''certainty'''. We’ve been using this word a lot in the last few paragraphs, in a way that makes it seem to be nearly synonymous with “knowledge”. Understanding the relation between these two concepts will help us to understand epistemic status better. To be ''certain'' of a proposition is to ''regard it as knowledge'', as opposed to regarding it as doubtful. When you are certain of something you act on it and draw inferences from it confidently, whereas when you are uncertain you are more tentative, always keeping in mind the possibility that the proposition is false and planning for that contingency. In this sense, people are sometimes certain of things unreasonably. ~~The~~ fervent racist ~~discussed above~~, for example, might not hesitate to act on his belief. However, when we speak of certainty as an epistemic status, we are referring not to the way a person actually does regard the proposition but to the way it is ''reasonable'' for him to regard it. We might call this ''rational certainty'' or ''objective certainty'' (as opposed to subjective certainty). In any case, this is how I am going to use the word “certain” going forward.		Let’s start with '''certainty'''. We’ve been using this word a lot in the last few paragraphs, in a way that makes it seem to be nearly synonymous with “knowledge”. Understanding the relation between these two concepts will help us to understand epistemic status better. To be ''certain'' of a proposition is to ''regard it as knowledge'', as opposed to regarding it as doubtful. When you are certain of something you act on it and draw inferences from it confidently, whereas when you are uncertain you are more tentative, always keeping in mind the possibility that the proposition is false and planning for that contingency. In this sense, people are sometimes certain of things unreasonably. A fervent racist, for example, might be certain that other races are inferior to his own and not hesitate to act on his belief. However, when we speak of certainty as an epistemic status, we are referring not to the way a person actually does regard the proposition but to the way it is ''reasonable'' for him to regard it. We might call this ''rational certainty'' or ''objective certainty'' (as opposed to subjective certainty). In any case, this is how I am going to use the word “certain” going forward.

	There are some disputes among epistemologists about the relationship between certainty and knowledge. However, the following is comparatively uncontroversial: ''the beliefs that a person is entitled to classify as knowledge and those that he is entitled to classify as certain are the same''. The difference between classifying them as certain and classifying them as knowledge is that, in classifying them as certain, he is contrasting them specifically with beliefs that have a lower epistemic status and is focusing on the fact that he is in a position to act on these beliefs and to draw inferences on these beliefs without hesitation.<Ref>Among the disputed issues are whether it is possible to be certain of something that one doesn’t actually know and whether it is possible to know something without being certain of it.</Ref>		There are some disputes among epistemologists about the relationship between certainty and knowledge. However, the following is comparatively uncontroversial: ''the beliefs that a person is entitled to classify as knowledge and those that he is entitled to classify as certain are the same''. The difference between classifying them as certain and classifying them as knowledge is that, in classifying them as certain, he is contrasting them specifically with beliefs that have a lower epistemic status and is focusing on the fact that he is in a position to act on these beliefs and to draw inferences on these beliefs without hesitation.<Ref>Among the disputed issues are whether it is possible to be certain of something that one doesn’t actually know and whether it is possible to know something without being certain of it.</Ref>

Stevenwarden at 21:03, 28 August 2024

2024-08-28T21:03:02Z

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	[[file:Epistemic_status.png\|thumb\|700px]]		[[file:Epistemic_status.png\|thumb\|700px]]
	In evaluating arguments, it is necessary to determine the epistemic status of each premise—where it falls along the scale running from ignorance to knowledge.		In evaluating arguments, it is necessary to determine the epistemic status of each premise—where it falls along the scale running from ignorance to knowledge.


	In some unusual cases, we might be able to specify this to such a fine degree of resolution that we can assign a number to it, and different scales have been devised for assigning such numbers. In most cases, however, this is not possible, and we distinguish epistemic statuses more coarsely using terms like “unfounded”, “possible”, “probable”, and “certain”. In order to get clearer on epistemic status, we will need to discuss each of these terms.		In some unusual cases, we might be able to specify this to such a fine degree of resolution that we can assign a number to it, and different scales have been devised for assigning such numbers. In most cases, however, this is not possible, and we distinguish epistemic statuses more coarsely using terms like “unfounded”, “possible”, “probable”, and “certain”. In order to get clearer on epistemic status, we will need to discuss each of these terms.
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	In addition to these questions, you might also consider how distinctive Bob’s appearance is: is he someone who is easily recognized in a crowd, or someone who can easily be mistaken for someone else? Notice that for each of these questions there is a range of possible answers, and that how sure you could be that Bob was on the quad depends on where along that range your answer falls.		In addition to these questions, you might also consider how distinctive Bob’s appearance is: is he someone who is easily recognized in a crowd, or someone who can easily be mistaken for someone else? Notice that for each of these questions there is a range of possible answers, and that how sure you could be that Bob was on the quad depends on where along that range your answer falls.

	Another way in which you might have some reason to believe something without being certain of it is by remembering it vaguely. This would be the case with someone who did see Bob on the quad recently and recognized him but couldn’t recall with certainty ''when'' the encounter occurred. To get a sense of the considerations that are relevant to determining the epistemic status for this person of the proposition that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, we could make up a list of questions similar to those that we considered above for the case of seeing Bob on the quad. A third way that one might come to have an intermediate epistemic status with respect to a proposition is by inferring it from earlier propositions. In the example we’ve just been considering, your conclusion that Bob couldn’t have been behind the wheel of the getaway car, has such a status because it is inferred from uncertain premises. But there are inferences in which, even if the premises are certain, the conclusion cannot be inferred with certainty. Later, when we consider some of these types of arguments in greater detail, we will get a sense of the factors that would lead to the conclusions being nearer to or further from certainty.		Another way in which you might have some reason to believe something without being certain of it is by remembering it vaguely. This would be the case with someone who did see Bob on the quad recently and recognized him but couldn’t recall with certainty ''when'' the encounter occurred. To get a sense of the considerations that are relevant to determining the epistemic status for this person of the proposition that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, we could make up a list of questions similar to those that we considered above for the case of seeing Bob on the quad. A third way that one might come to have an intermediate epistemic status with respect to a proposition is by inferring it from earlier propositions. In the example we’ve just been considering, your conclusion that Bob couldn’t have been behind the wheel of the getaway car has such a status because it is inferred from uncertain premises. But there are inferences in which, even if the premises are certain, the conclusion cannot be inferred with certainty. Later, when we consider some of these types of arguments in greater detail, we will get a sense of the factors that would lead to the conclusions being nearer to or further from certainty.

	=Certainty=		=Certainty=

GSalmieri: /* Epistemic Status as Relative to an Audience but Objective */

2024-08-27T23:05:36Z

Epistemic Status as Relative to an Audience but Objective

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:05, 27 August 2024
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	Since the premises are false this argument doesn’t give us any reason to believe that pigs are mammals, but it certainly doesn’t show that they’re ''not'' mammals!		Since the premises are false this argument doesn’t give us any reason to believe that pigs are mammals, but it certainly doesn’t show that they’re ''not'' mammals!

	=Epistemic Status as Relative to an Audience ~~but~~ Objective=		=Epistemic Status as Relative to an Audience and Objective=

	To be known is to be known to ''someone'', and different people know different things. In an argument, premises are being offered to ''someone'' as a reason to accept some conclusion. Let’s call the person or people to whom an argument is being given the audience. Clearly, then, in assessing the premises of an argument, what we need to figure out is whether ''the audience knows them''—or, more generally, what their epistemic status is for the audience. When we speak of epistemic status, we always mean the epistemic status of a particular proposition for a particular audience. And the same proposition may have a different epistemic status for different audiences.<ref>To illustrate this, imagine a large party at which Al, Barbara, Carla, and Dan are all in attendance. Al and Barbara hardly ever socialize without one another, and both Carla and Dan know this. While Barbara is waiting in line to get refreshments, Al heads to the bathroom, running into Carla on the way. When Carla sees Al, she infers that Barbara is also at the party, though she can’t be quite certain of this, because it could be one of those rare occasions when one of the two socializes without the other. In the meantime, Dan sees Barbara waiting in line and infers that Al is at the party. Like Carla, he is not quite certain of his conclusion. So, Carla and Dan both believe that Al and Barbara are both at the party. Carla knows that Al is at the party and the proposition that Barbara is there has a weaker epistemic status, whereas the situation is reversed for Dan.</ref>		To be known is to be known to ''someone'', and different people know different things. In an argument, premises are being offered to ''someone'' as a reason to accept some conclusion. Let’s call the person or people to whom an argument is being given the audience. Clearly, then, in assessing the premises of an argument, what we need to figure out is whether ''the audience knows them''—or, more generally, what their epistemic status is for the audience. When we speak of epistemic status, we always mean the epistemic status of a particular proposition for a particular audience. And the same proposition may have a different epistemic status for different audiences.<ref>To illustrate this, imagine a large party at which Al, Barbara, Carla, and Dan are all in attendance. Al and Barbara hardly ever socialize without one another, and both Carla and Dan know this. While Barbara is waiting in line to get refreshments, Al heads to the bathroom, running into Carla on the way. When Carla sees Al, she infers that Barbara is also at the party, though she can’t be quite certain of this, because it could be one of those rare occasions when one of the two socializes without the other. In the meantime, Dan sees Barbara waiting in line and infers that Al is at the party. Like Carla, he is not quite certain of his conclusion. So, Carla and Dan both believe that Al and Barbara are both at the party. Carla knows that Al is at the party and the proposition that Barbara is there has a weaker epistemic status, whereas the situation is reversed for Dan.</ref>
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	When evaluating arguments for certain purposes, is important to consider the (subjective) firmness of an audience’s beliefs. The more firmly the audience believes the premises of an argument, the more persuasive it will find the argument. So, if we were interested in arguments primarily for the purposes of persuading other people, we would have to evaluate the premises with an eye to how firmly the audience believes them. This is how we might proceed in a rhetoric class or if we were considering whether to use an argument in an advertisement or a political campaign. However, this is not why we are interested in arguments in this class. We are interested in arguments because inference is a crucial ''means of knowledge''. From this point of view, what makes an argument good is not that it persuades anyone of anything, but that it puts the audience in a position to know that the conclusion is true (or else brings the audience close to such a position). Therefore, what is relevant to us when assessing premises is not how strongly the audience believes them, but what their epistemic status is for the audience.		When evaluating arguments for certain purposes, is important to consider the (subjective) firmness of an audience’s beliefs. The more firmly the audience believes the premises of an argument, the more persuasive it will find the argument. So, if we were interested in arguments primarily for the purposes of persuading other people, we would have to evaluate the premises with an eye to how firmly the audience believes them. This is how we might proceed in a rhetoric class or if we were considering whether to use an argument in an advertisement or a political campaign. However, this is not why we are interested in arguments in this class. We are interested in arguments because inference is a crucial ''means of knowledge''. From this point of view, what makes an argument good is not that it persuades anyone of anything, but that it puts the audience in a position to know that the conclusion is true (or else brings the audience close to such a position). Therefore, what is relevant to us when assessing premises is not how strongly the audience believes them, but what their epistemic status is for the audience.

	And the audience we are primarily interested in is ourselves. After all, we are studying arguments because we want to assess the arguments on which our own beliefs are based and to reach new knowledge. Therefore, when assessing the premises of the arguments we consider in this class, you should be focused on the epistemic status of these premises ''for you''. Do you know the premises to be true? Are you entirely ignorant as to whether they’re true? Or does your state with respect to them fall somewhere along the continuum between knowledge and ignorance? If so, where along that continuum? ~~In asking and answering these questions, you need~~ to keep in mind that ~~whether~~ you ~~know~~ something ~~is not simply~~ a ~~matter~~ of ~~how sure~~ you ''~~feel~~'' ~~about~~ it, ~~but a matter of how objectively strong your~~ ''~~reasons~~'' are.		And the audience we are primarily interested in is ourselves. After all, we are studying arguments because we want to assess the arguments on which our own beliefs are based and to reach new knowledge. Therefore, when assessing the premises of the arguments we consider in this class, you should be focused on the epistemic status of these premises ''for you''. Do you know the premises to be true? Are you entirely ignorant as to whether they’re true? Or does your state with respect to them fall somewhere along the continuum between knowledge and ignorance? If so, where along that continuum?

			One thing to keep in mind when assessing propositions, is that you can't be sure of something if you don't understand it. If someone makes a claim using a lot of impressive technical terminology that you don't understand, then you're not in a position to know that the claim is true. You're not even in a position to think that its possibly or probably true, if you don't understand at all what the claim means. So in assessing it, you'd have to mark it as unfounded. In doing so, you're not necessarily saying that the person making the claim is mistaken or that he did something wrong. You're just saying that ''you'' are not in a position to treat the claim as knowledge or even as a hypothesis: given your state of knowledge, you're unable to use this proposition as a grounds to reach any further conclusions.

GSalmieri: /* Possibility */

2024-08-27T22:54:52Z

Possibility

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	To see this, imagine calling the police to tell them of the possibility that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, three minutes before the robbery in Dallas. They would ask you ''why'' you thought it was possible, and they would not react favorably if you responded that “anything’s possible”. They would have quite a different response, however, if you told them about your experience of thinking you recognized him. (Indeed, this report could prove quite useful to them. If Bob has been claiming that he was on the quad at that time, your report could make this alibi considerably more credible.)		To see this, imagine calling the police to tell them of the possibility that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, three minutes before the robbery in Dallas. They would ask you ''why'' you thought it was possible, and they would not react favorably if you responded that “anything’s possible”. They would have quite a different response, however, if you told them about your experience of thinking you recognized him. (Indeed, this report could prove quite useful to them. If Bob has been claiming that he was on the quad at that time, your report could make this alibi considerably more credible.)

	There are other contexts in which we can see the idea of epistemic possibility at work in the law. We are all familiar with the idea of a “suspect”—that is, of a person whom the police think ''might'' have committed a certain crime, and whom they set to work investigating. There may be a number of suspects for a given crime but notice that the police don’t regard ''everyone'' as a suspect, nor do they consider everyone who had the opportunity and ability to commit it a suspect, unless there are only a few such people. (Recall the case discussed earlier, in which the fact that Natalie was one of the several million people who had access to the garden in which Carl was killed didn’t give us any reason to suspect that Natalie was the murderer.) In general, the police need some specific reason to suspect someone of a crime, and likewise, we need some specific reason to suspect a proposition of being true—that is, to classify it as “possible”.		There are other contexts in which we can see the idea of epistemic possibility at work in the law. We are all familiar with the idea of a “suspect”—that is, of a person whom the police think ''might'' have committed a certain crime, and whom they set to work investigating. There may be a number of suspects for a given crime but notice that the police don’t regard ''everyone'' as a suspect, nor do they consider everyone who had the opportunity and ability to commit it a suspect, unless there are only a few such people. In general, the police need some specific reason to suspect someone of a crime, and likewise, we need some specific reason to suspect a proposition of being true—that is, to classify it as “possible”.

	=Unfounded Propositions=		=Unfounded Propositions=

GSalmieri at 22:52, 27 August 2024

2024-08-27T22:52:32Z

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	Perhaps you’re thinking that “anything is possible” and that you would be in a position to say that Bob “might have been on the quad” even if you hadn’t had the experience of seeing someone who you thought you recognized as him there. There is a sense of the word “possible” in which you could say that it was possible that Bob was on the quad, even if you hadn’t had the experience, but there is another sense of the word in which this would be false. And it is this sense—let’s call it ''epistemic possibility'' that is relevant for our present purposes.		Perhaps you’re thinking that “anything is possible” and that you would be in a position to say that Bob “might have been on the quad” even if you hadn’t had the experience of seeing someone who you thought you recognized as him there. There is a sense of the word “possible” in which you could say that it was possible that Bob was on the quad, even if you hadn’t had the experience, but there is another sense of the word in which this would be false. And it is this sense—let’s call it ''epistemic possibility'' that is relevant for our present purposes.

	To see this, imagine calling the police to tell them of the possibility that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, three minutes before the robbery in ~~Manhattan~~. They would ask you ''why'' you thought it was possible, and they would not react favorably if you responded that “anything’s possible”. They would have quite a different response, however, if you told them about your experience of thinking you recognized him. (Indeed, this report could prove quite useful to them. If Bob has been claiming that he was on the quad at that time, your report could make this alibi considerably more credible.)		To see this, imagine calling the police to tell them of the possibility that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, three minutes before the robbery in Dallas. They would ask you ''why'' you thought it was possible, and they would not react favorably if you responded that “anything’s possible”. They would have quite a different response, however, if you told them about your experience of thinking you recognized him. (Indeed, this report could prove quite useful to them. If Bob has been claiming that he was on the quad at that time, your report could make this alibi considerably more credible.)

	There are other contexts in which we can see the idea of epistemic possibility at work in the law. We are all familiar with the idea of a “suspect”—that is, of a person whom the police think ''might'' have committed a certain crime, and whom they set to work investigating. There may be a number of suspects for a given crime but notice that the police don’t regard ''everyone'' as a suspect, nor do they consider everyone who had the opportunity and ability to commit it a suspect, unless there are only a few such people. (Recall the case discussed earlier, in which the fact that Natalie was one of the several million people who had access to the garden in which Carl was killed didn’t give us any reason to suspect that Natalie was the murderer.) In general, the police need some specific reason to suspect someone of a crime, and likewise, we need some specific reason to suspect a proposition of being true—that is, to classify it as “possible”.		There are other contexts in which we can see the idea of epistemic possibility at work in the law. We are all familiar with the idea of a “suspect”—that is, of a person whom the police think ''might'' have committed a certain crime, and whom they set to work investigating. There may be a number of suspects for a given crime but notice that the police don’t regard ''everyone'' as a suspect, nor do they consider everyone who had the opportunity and ability to commit it a suspect, unless there are only a few such people. (Recall the case discussed earlier, in which the fact that Natalie was one of the several million people who had access to the garden in which Carl was killed didn’t give us any reason to suspect that Natalie was the murderer.) In general, the police need some specific reason to suspect someone of a crime, and likewise, we need some specific reason to suspect a proposition of being true—that is, to classify it as “possible”.

	=Unfounded Propositions=		=Unfounded Propositions=
	Epistemically possible propositions are to be contrasted with '''unfounded''' ones. A proposition is unfounded when there is no reason to believe it. This is the status of things that you make up out of thin air—for example, that there are monsters under your bed, that your roommate committed a murder five years ago, or that his second cousin once lived in ~~Manhattan~~. Some of these propositions are more far-fetched than others—there are no such things as monsters, and very few people commit murders, but many people live in ~~Manhattan~~. However, all these propositions have in common that you have ''no reason'' to think they are true, or even to consider them, and the proper course of action is to dismiss them out of hand.		Epistemically possible propositions are to be contrasted with '''unfounded''' ones. A proposition is unfounded when there is no reason to believe it. This is the status of things that you make up out of thin air—for example, that there are monsters under your bed, that your roommate committed a murder five years ago, or that his second cousin once lived in Dallas. Some of these propositions are more far-fetched than others—there are no such things as monsters, and very few people commit murders, but many people live in Dallas. However, all these propositions have in common that you have ''no reason'' to think they are true, or even to consider them, and the proper course of action is to dismiss them out of hand.

	Because we have no reason to believe them, unfounded premises can offer ''no support whatsoever'' to any conclusions that we might infer from them. Thus, unfoundedness is the lowest epistemic status.		Because we have no reason to believe them, unfounded premises can offer ''no support whatsoever'' to any conclusions that we might infer from them. Thus, unfoundedness is the lowest epistemic status.

	In some cases, we not only have no reason to believe that a proposition is true, we actually have reason to believe that it is false. This happens when the proposition contradicts something that we know (or have reason to believe) to be true. For example, if you knew that your roommate only had one second cousin and that she spent her whole life in Wyoming, you would know that the proposition that she lives in ~~Manhattan~~ was false—or, to put it more simply, you would know that she did not live in ~~Manhattan~~. (By the same token, if it were ''probable'' that she had spent her whole life in Wyoming, it would be probable that she didn’t live in ~~Manhattan~~.) In certain respects, propositions that are certainly or probably false can be thought of as having an even lower status than that of unfounded propositions. However, as far as their value as premises is concerned, an unfounded premise is no better than one that is certainly false: neither gives us any reason at all to believe any conclusion.		In some cases, we not only have no reason to believe that a proposition is true, we actually have reason to believe that it is false. This happens when the proposition contradicts something that we know (or have reason to believe) to be true. For example, if you knew that your roommate only had one second cousin and that she spent her whole life in Wyoming, you would know that the proposition that she lives in Dallas was false—or, to put it more simply, you would know that she did not live in Dallas. (By the same token, if it were ''probable'' that she had spent her whole life in Wyoming, it would be probable that she didn’t live in Dallas.) In certain respects, propositions that are certainly or probably false can be thought of as having an even lower status than that of unfounded propositions. However, as far as their value as premises is concerned, an unfounded premise is no better than one that is certainly false: neither gives us any reason at all to believe any conclusion.

	=The Continuum=		=The Continuum=

GSalmieri: /* Between Knowledge and Ignorance */

2024-08-27T22:51:13Z

Between Knowledge and Ignorance

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:51, 27 August 2024
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	To get a sense of the continuum between knowing something and being wholly ignorant of it, it helps to consider some examples. Let’s start with the following scenario: While walking across the quad one day at 8:00am, you see someone at a distance whom you almost recognize as your acquaintance Bob, but you lose sight of him before you can be sure. If you had gotten a better look at the man and recognized him as Bob, then you would know that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am. As things stand, however, you do not know it. Still, you are not in the same position with respect to the proposition “Bob was on the quad at 8:00am” as you would be if you hadn’t seen what you did. Your experience on the quad gives you some ''reason'' to believe the proposition, without making you ''certain'' of it.		To get a sense of the continuum between knowing something and being wholly ignorant of it, it helps to consider some examples. Let’s start with the following scenario: While walking across the quad one day at 8:00am, you see someone at a distance whom you almost recognize as your acquaintance Bob, but you lose sight of him before you can be sure. If you had gotten a better look at the man and recognized him as Bob, then you would know that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am. As things stand, however, you do not know it. Still, you are not in the same position with respect to the proposition “Bob was on the quad at 8:00am” as you would be if you hadn’t seen what you did. Your experience on the quad gives you some ''reason'' to believe the proposition, without making you ''certain'' of it.

	Notice that you might go on to use this proposition in arguments. Suppose, for example, that a bank robbery was committed in ~~Manhattan~~ at 8:03 and Bob was suspected of being behind the wheel of the getaway car. If you knew that Bob was on the quad at 8:00, you could be certain, via the following argument, that these allegations are false.		Notice that you might go on to use this proposition in arguments. Suppose, for example, that a bank robbery was committed in Dallas at 8:03 and Bob was suspected of being behind the wheel of the getaway car. If you knew that Bob was on the quad at 8:00, you could be certain, via the following argument, that these allegations are false.

	{{Map\|https://app.reasonspace.com/arguments/6676e764-6cfb-4f6c-af5a-830115c9852e}}		{{Map\|https://app.reasonspace.com/arguments/6676e764-6cfb-4f6c-af5a-830115c9852e}}
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	In addition to these questions, you might also consider how distinctive Bob’s appearance is: is he someone who is easily recognized in a crowd, or someone who can easily be mistaken for someone else? Notice that for each of these questions there is a range of possible answers, and that how sure you could be that Bob was on the quad depends on where along that range your answer falls.		In addition to these questions, you might also consider how distinctive Bob’s appearance is: is he someone who is easily recognized in a crowd, or someone who can easily be mistaken for someone else? Notice that for each of these questions there is a range of possible answers, and that how sure you could be that Bob was on the quad depends on where along that range your answer falls.

	Another way in which you might have some reason to believe something without being certain of it is by remembering it vaguely. This would be the case with someone who did see Bob on the quad recently and recognized him but couldn’t recall with certainty ''when'' the encounter occurred. To get a sense of the considerations that are relevant to determining the epistemic status for this person of the proposition that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, we could make up a list of questions similar to those that we considered above for the case of seeing Bob on the quad. A third way that one might come to have an intermediate epistemic status with respect to a proposition is by inferring it from earlier propositions. In the example we’ve just been considering, your conclusion that Bob couldn’t have been behind the wheel of the getaway car, has such a status because it is inferred from uncertain premises. But~~, as was mentioned briefly earlier,~~ there are inferences in which, even if the premises are certain, the conclusion cannot be inferred with certainty. Later, when we consider some of these types of arguments in greater detail, we will get a sense of the factors that would lead to the conclusions being nearer to or further from certainty.		Another way in which you might have some reason to believe something without being certain of it is by remembering it vaguely. This would be the case with someone who did see Bob on the quad recently and recognized him but couldn’t recall with certainty ''when'' the encounter occurred. To get a sense of the considerations that are relevant to determining the epistemic status for this person of the proposition that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, we could make up a list of questions similar to those that we considered above for the case of seeing Bob on the quad. A third way that one might come to have an intermediate epistemic status with respect to a proposition is by inferring it from earlier propositions. In the example we’ve just been considering, your conclusion that Bob couldn’t have been behind the wheel of the getaway car, has such a status because it is inferred from uncertain premises. But there are inferences in which, even if the premises are certain, the conclusion cannot be inferred with certainty. Later, when we consider some of these types of arguments in greater detail, we will get a sense of the factors that would lead to the conclusions being nearer to or further from certainty.

	=Certainty=		=Certainty=

GSalmieri: /* Between Knowledge and Ignorance */

2024-08-27T22:36:20Z

Between Knowledge and Ignorance

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:36, 27 August 2024
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	Notice that you might go on to use this proposition in arguments. Suppose, for example, that a bank robbery was committed in Manhattan at 8:03 and Bob was suspected of being behind the wheel of the getaway car. If you knew that Bob was on the quad at 8:00, you could be certain, via the following argument, that these allegations are false.		Notice that you might go on to use this proposition in arguments. Suppose, for example, that a bank robbery was committed in Manhattan at 8:03 and Bob was suspected of being behind the wheel of the getaway car. If you knew that Bob was on the quad at 8:00, you could be certain, via the following argument, that these allegations are false.
	~~{\| class="wikitable"~~
	~~\| Map 15:~~		{{Map\|https://app.reasonspace.com/arguments/6676e764-6cfb-4f6c-af5a-830115c9852e}}
	\|-
	\|{{Map\|https://app.reasonspace.com/arguments/6676e764-6cfb-4f6c-af5a-830115c9852e}}
	\|}

	As things stand, however, you do not know Proposition 2, and so you do not know the conclusion, Proposition 3. But, because you have some reason to believe Proposition 2, you have some reason to believe the conclusion as well. Perhaps, then, you should go to the police and make a statement. If you do, how much weight should the police give to your testimony? Let’s consider some of the questions that they might ask you (and that you could ask of yourself):		As things stand, however, you do not know Proposition 2, and so you do not know the conclusion, Proposition 3. But, because you have some reason to believe Proposition 2, you have some reason to believe the conclusion as well. Perhaps, then, you should go to the police and make a statement. If you do, how much weight should the police give to your testimony? Let’s consider some of the questions that they might ask you (and that you could ask of yourself):
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	Another way in which you might have some reason to believe something without being certain of it is by remembering it vaguely. This would be the case with someone who did see Bob on the quad recently and recognized him but couldn’t recall with certainty ''when'' the encounter occurred. To get a sense of the considerations that are relevant to determining the epistemic status for this person of the proposition that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, we could make up a list of questions similar to those that we considered above for the case of seeing Bob on the quad. A third way that one might come to have an intermediate epistemic status with respect to a proposition is by inferring it from earlier propositions. In the example we’ve just been considering, your conclusion that Bob couldn’t have been behind the wheel of the getaway car, has such a status because it is inferred from uncertain premises. But, as was mentioned briefly earlier, there are inferences in which, even if the premises are certain, the conclusion cannot be inferred with certainty. Later, when we consider some of these types of arguments in greater detail, we will get a sense of the factors that would lead to the conclusions being nearer to or further from certainty.		Another way in which you might have some reason to believe something without being certain of it is by remembering it vaguely. This would be the case with someone who did see Bob on the quad recently and recognized him but couldn’t recall with certainty ''when'' the encounter occurred. To get a sense of the considerations that are relevant to determining the epistemic status for this person of the proposition that Bob was on the quad at 8:00am, we could make up a list of questions similar to those that we considered above for the case of seeing Bob on the quad. A third way that one might come to have an intermediate epistemic status with respect to a proposition is by inferring it from earlier propositions. In the example we’ve just been considering, your conclusion that Bob couldn’t have been behind the wheel of the getaway car, has such a status because it is inferred from uncertain premises. But, as was mentioned briefly earlier, there are inferences in which, even if the premises are certain, the conclusion cannot be inferred with certainty. Later, when we consider some of these types of arguments in greater detail, we will get a sense of the factors that would lead to the conclusions being nearer to or further from certainty.


	=Certainty=		=Certainty=